Discovery of New Botulism Toxin Prompts Bioterrorism Fears

Two new studies recently published in the Journal of Infectious Diseases have reportedly identified for the first time in more than 40 years a new strain of Clostridium botulinum, prompting debate over whether the genetic sequences needed to reproduce the toxin should be made available to the public despite concerns that the information could pose a security risk. Jason Barash and Stephen Arnon, “A Novel Strain of Clostridium botulinum That Produces Type B and Type H Botulinum Toxins,” Journal of Infectious Diseases, October 2013. Nir Dover, et al., “Molecular Characterization of a Novel Botulinum Neurotoxin Type H Gene,” Journal of Infectious Diseases, October 2013.

According to an October 10, 2013, article in CIDRAP News, the California
Department of Public Health researchers who discovered botulinum neurotoxin
type H (BoNT/H) using an infant botulism case have declined to release
their data until an antitoxin has been developed. They apparently arrived at
their decision after consulting with several government agencies as well as
the journal’s editors, who in turn exempted the researchers from the usual
requirement that they submit gene nucleotide sequences to the International
Nucleotide Sequence Databases before publication.

At the same time, however, David Relman, chief of infectious diseases with the
VA Palo Alto Health Care System and principle investigator with the Stanford
University School of Medicine, notes in a concurrent editorial that the BoNT/H
case recalls the controversy surrounding Nature’s decision to publish research
detailing the creation of a human-contagious form of avian flu. In particular,
he suggests that the scientific community needs to invest in a mechanism
to mitigate the risk of such studies while allowing important research to
continue. David Relman, “‘Inconvenient truths’ in the pursuit of scientific
knowledge and public health,” Journal of Infectious Diseases, October 2013.

“I hope that this discovery forces policy-makers, scientists, and other members
of the general society to confront the reality of increasingly frequent and
consequential risks that arise from work in the life sciences, and develop more
robust strategies for risk mitigation,” Relman told CIDRAP News. “I am quite
worried that the challenges and complexities of developing such strategies
has caused many scientists, science policy-makers and others in government
to turn away, and either proclaim that the risks are not real, or that we have
no such mechanisms for limited communication and therefore that we should
stop working on this.”