Federal Appeals Court Finds California Downer Livestock Law Not Preempted
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has lifted a preliminary injunction that prevented California from enforcing a law adopted after The Humane Society’s video of the mistreatment of downer cattle at a slaughterhouse became public and led to a massive beef recall in 2008. Nat’l Meat Ass’n v. Brown, 09-15483 (9th Cir., decided March 31, 2010). The National Meat Association challenged California’s law, which prohibits slaughterhouses from receiving, processing or selling nonambulatory animals, as preempted by the Federal Meat Inspection Act (FMIA), and the district court agreed. The state law also prohibits moving a nonambulatory animal without a sling or other sled-like or wheeled conveyance.
According to the Ninth Circuit, the federal law, which contains an express preemption provision, prescribes what is to be done with nonambulatory animals to be slaughtered and sold for human consumption; it does not limit states “in their ability to regulate what types of meat may be sold for human consumption in the first place.” The district court opined that while states may ban the slaughter of certain species, “once a state allows a species to be slaughtered, it cannot impose further restrictions.” The Ninth Circuit characterized this argument as “hogwash,” noting that federal law simply regulates the meat inspection process, and “states are free to decide which animals may be turned into meat.” The court observed, “Regulating what kinds of animals may be slaughtered calls for a host of practical, moral and public health judgments that go far beyond those made in the FMIA. These are the kinds of judgments reserved to the states, and nothing in the FMIA requires states to make them on a species-wide basis or not at all.”
As to the state law provision prohibiting dragging or pushing downer animals, the court suggested that the National Meat Association “is likely to succeed on its preemption claim,” although “it hasn’t shown a likelihood of irreparable injury or that the balance of the equities and the public interest tip in its favor for this provision.” The court vacated the preliminary injunction, but said its ruling did not preclude the entry of a preliminary injunction as to the state law’s humane handling provision “after appropriate findings are made.” The court also indicated that other legal theories might support the entry of a preliminary injunction as to the entirety of the California law. Issues that were not addressed by either court include whether the state law violates the dormant commerce clause or is unconstitutionally vague.
