Federal Court Dismisses “I Can’t Believe It’s Not Butter” Case
A federal district court in California has dismissed claims against the company that makes the product “I Can’t Believe It’s Not Butter,” finding that, while not preempted under federal labeling law, the complaint failed to allege facts “plausibly suggestive” of a claim entitling the plaintiff to relief under the U.S. Supreme Court’s recently adopted Twombly/Iqbal pleading standard. Rosen v. Unilever U.S., Inc., No. 09-02563 (N.D. Cal., decided May 3, 2010). The plaintiff alleged that the company violated state consumer protection laws by advertising its product as nutritious when, in fact, it contains partially hydrogenated oil, “an artificial, man-made substance that has no nutritional value and is known to cause a number of health problems.”
The defendant sought to dismiss the claims as expressly preempted under the Nutritional Labeling and Education Act, contending that use of the phrase “0g Trans Fat” on product labels complies with Food and Drug Administration regulations where a product contains less than 0.5 grams of trans fat per serving. The court disagreed, finding that the plaintiff was not directing his allegations at the phrase, but was, instead, alleging that the company deceptively promoted its product as nutritious, healthy to consume, better than similar products, and “Made with a Blend of Nutritious Oil.” Because these statements are not regulated under federal law, claims based on them could not be preempted.
The defendant also challenged the plaintiff’s complaint for failure to plead “enough facts to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly 550 U.S. 544 (2007). Citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009), the court also observed that a claim is plausible on its face “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” The court set forth Iqbal’s two-pronged analysis, that is, a court first discounts allegations that are little more than “threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements,” and then examines the remaining allegations to determine whether they “state a plausible claim for relief.”
The court reduced the plaintiff’s claims to a syllogism: “For the representation ‘blend of nutritious oils’ to be true, all constituent oils must be nutritious. One of the constituent oils in the product [partially hydrogenated oil] is not nutritious. Therefore the product representation is false.” The court found the major premise (“all constituent oils must be nutritious in order for the blend to be nutritious”) to be “merely a conclusion.” Because the plaintiff did not allege any facts specific to what a “blend” must contain to be “nutritious,” the court found the conclusion unsupported by any facts. The court also found the minor premise (“partially hydrogenated oil is not nutritious”) a mere conclusion lacking factual support, noting that federal regulations define trans fat as a nutrient.
Applying the second Iqbal prong, the court examined the relationship between the premise that partially hydrogenated oil is not a nutrient and the allegedly false representations and found “an implausible legal theory.” According to the court, the plaintiff committed three logical fallacies—the fallacy of begging the question, the fallacy of composition and the fallacy of division—and, thus, the complaint was rendered implausible on its face. The court dismissed the claims with prejudice.
